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The cooperative solution concept introduced here, the Stable Demand Set,
contains the Core and is included in the Zhou Bargaining Set, eliminating
the “dominated” coalition structures. The demand vectors belonging to the
Stable Demand Set are self-stable. In the class of constant-sum homogeneous
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The interest in the stability properties of coalitions and payoﬀ allocations in coalition
formation games can be traced back to the ﬁrst half of the 20th century, and the
discussion about which solution concept we should use to predict coalition structures
and payoﬀ allocations at the same time remains open. Value concepts yield an ex
ante evaluation, hence they cannot oﬀer predictions about the prevailing payoﬀ
distribution within the prevailing coalitions. On the other hand, solution concepts
like the bargaining set, the stable sets, and the kernel avoid the emptiness problems
of the core for a large class of games and do face the problem of predicting the
possible ex post conﬁgurations of payoﬀs, but the set of solutions is often too large.
Most solution concepts determine the distribution of gains within given coalitions or
coalition structures, and hence are very helpful to model arbitration problems, where
coalitions are formed before the bargaining process over the distribution of payoﬀs
begins. In contrast, as pointed out in Bennett (1985), the aspirations approach
seems well suited for situations where the formation of coalitions is endogenous.
The cooperative solution concept introduced in this paper, the stable demand
set,s h a r e st h ec e n t r a lr o l eo fp a y o ﬀ demands with the aspiration approach, but it
does not limit attention to the domain of aspirations. While on the one hand the
traditional imputation approach determines payoﬀ distribution after having ﬁxed a
coalition structure, and while on the other hand the aspirations approach determines
coalitional outcomes after having ﬁxed a payoﬀ distribution, we allow payoﬀ distrib-
ution and coalition formation to be simultaneously determined.I ns p i t eo ft h i sl a r g e r
strategic space, we will show that in constant-sum homogeneous weighted majority
games our stable demands coincide with the balanced aspirations of the game.1
The stable demand set turns out to contain the core, and is a subset of the
Zhou bargaining set. With respect to these and other solutions in the bargaining
s e tt r a d i t i o n ,t h e r ea r et w om a i ni n n o v a t i o n s :( 1 )w em a k eu s eo ft h ef a c tt h a te v e r y
allocation can be viewed as a pair consisting of a demand vector and a coalition struc-
1The concept of balanced aspirations is well explained in Bennett (1983).
1ture; and (2) for every proposed pair the set of counterobjections (to objections to
such a proposal) is restricted to include only those pairs that use the same demand
vector as in the original proposal. The second feature is the one determining the
selection of a subset of the Zhou bargaining set. In particular, the selection obtained
through the stable demand set has a very general property: in grand-coalition su-
peradditive games no “dominated” coalition structure can ever be part of a solution
(Theorem 2). Beside this property, we also show that the stable demand set is
immune to most of the other criticisms moved against bargaining set type solutions.
To give a clear example of the meaningfulness of the selection provided by the
stable demand set in applications, we show in Section 3 that in any constant-sum
weighted majority game that admits a homogeneous representation the proportional
payoﬀ division is the unique stable outcome, and no previous bargaining set could
make such a sharp prediction.2 This result illustrates particularly well the role of the
axiom requiring that counterobjections be limited to those that can use the original
demand vector: the social norm of distributing payoﬀs proportionally to the relative
contributions (within the minimal winning coalition) is the only one that can be used
to counter all possible objections to a proposal where the proportional norm itself
is used. This type of self-stability is the key idea proposed by our concept.
In Section 4 the stable demand set is implemented for all superadditive games
satisfying the one-stage property, following the methodology of P´ erez-Castrillo and
Wettstein (2000). The mechanism is simple and serves to illustrate further the forces
behind our concept.
2 The stable demand set
In this section we introduce the cooperative solution concept, deﬁning it for any TU
game and discussing some general properties.
2There is however an interesting connection with the main simple solution in the von Neumann
and Morgenstern stable set. Druckman and Warwick (2002) is a good reference to see the empirical
relevance of proportional payoﬀs in legislative bargaining contexts.
22.1 Notation and Basic Deﬁnitions
Let N be the set of players, N ≡ {1,2,...,i,...,n}.L e tS ⊆ N represent a generic
coalition of players, S denote the set of possible coalitions, and v : S → R+ denote
the characteristic function. If v(i) = 0 for all i in N,t h ep a i r( N,v)i sc a l l e da
zero-normalized TU game. Given any n-dimensional payoﬀ vector x, x(S) denotes
the sum of the values corresponding to the components of x related to the members
of S: x(S) ≡
P
i∈S xi.W ew i l ld e n o t eb yΣ t h es e to fp o s s i b l ep a r t i t i o n so fN (or
set of coalition structures), and σ will represent a generic element of that set.
The stable demand set (henceforth SDS) is deﬁn e do nt h es p a c eo fnorm real-
izations X,w h e r e
X = {(α,σ) ∈ (Rn × Σ):
X
j∈S
αj ≤ v(S) for all S ∈ σ,|S| > 1}.
Thus, a candidate element for the SDS is a pair (α,σ)w h e r eα ∈ Rn is the demand
vector specifying what each player should receive for his cooperation with other
players in a coalition and σ is a coalition structure compatible with α in the sense
that coalitions of more than one player must be able to aﬀord the demands of their
members. No such restriction is imposed on singletons.3
For any given pair (α,σ) ∈ X, the corresponding feasible allocation ασ is obtained






αi if i ∈ S ∈ σ : |S| > 1
v(i)o t h e r w i s e .
(1)
In words, the demands are assigned as actual payoﬀs to the members of coalitions
with more than one player; singletons receive v(i) regardless of players’ demands.
2.2 Solution Concept
Consider a proposed pair (α,σ) ∈ X.
3The reason for not imposing any requirement on singletons is that α is interpreted as the
demand players make for cooperating with other players.
3Deﬁnition 1 An objection of a coalition T against the proposal (α,σ) is an alloca-
tion vector y such that
yi > ασ




yi ≤ v(T) (i.e., y is feasible for T).
Notice that objections are against actual payoﬀs, not against demands; thus, an
objecting player may receive less than his demand in the objection.
Deﬁnition 2 Ac o a l i t i o nZ can counter (or, make a counterobjection to) the objec-
tion of T against the proposal (α,σ) iﬀ
(1) Z ∩ T 6= ∅ and




αi >y i for all i ∈ T ∩ Z.
Deﬁnition 3 An objection to (α,σ) is justiﬁed iﬀ it cannot be countered.
Notice that with respect to the standard deﬁnition of a counterobjection (as
used in most versions of the bargaining set) we restrict the set of possible counter-
objections to include only those that can be derived using the same demand vector
of the original proposal. We also require the inequality within Z ∩ T to be strict.4
Because of the strict inequality, objections that use the original demand vector α
are always justiﬁed.
Deﬁnition 4 Ap a i r(α,σ) in X belongs to the stable demand set iﬀ there is no
justiﬁed objection to it.
If players can counterobject using an allocation that can be derived from the
same demand vector of the original proposal, it means that the demand vector itself
4Requiring this inequality to be strict is necessary for theorems 1 and 2, but not for theorem 3.
4is self-stable. Intuitively, trying to obtain larger shares (with an objection) does not
pay if there is the risk of being simply excluded from a coalition that distributes the
unchanged demands of the other players.
2.3 Important Properties and Relation to Previous Concepts
2.3.1 The aspiration approach
Like the stable demand set, the aspiration solution concepts also study the stability
of demand vectors. However, as we will now show, there is an important diﬀerence
with respect to the domain where the solution is deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 5 Ad e m a n dv e c t o rx ∈ Rn is an aspiration iﬀ it satisﬁes
1. x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N (maximality);
2. For all i ∈ N there exists a coalition S 3 i such that x(S) ≤ v(S) (feasibility).
Limiting attention to the space of aspirations, it is possible to deﬁne a variety
of solution concepts.5
The SDS is deﬁned in a larger space. Neither maximality nor feasibility are
imposed on demand vectors. However, maximality is obtained endogenously since
otherwise there would be a justiﬁed objection.
5These solution concepts are constructed by adding a stability condition to the requirements of
maximality and feasibility. The most important solution concepts are the aspiration bargaining set,
obtained by adding the partnership condition (Albers (1974), Bennett (1983)) and the aspiration
core, obtained by adding the balancedness condition (Cross (1967)). Denoting by Si(x)t h es e t
of coalitions containing i that are feasible given x,a na s p i r a t i o nv e c t o rx is partnered iﬀ for any
two players i and j either Si(x)=Sj(x)o rSi(x)\Sj(x)a n dSj(x)\Si(x) are both non-empty. An
aspiration vector x is balanced iﬀ it minimizes
P
i∈N xi in the space of aspirations. Other solution
concepts are the set of equal gains aspirations (Bennett 1983) and the aspiration kernel (Bennett
1985).
5Remark 1 If (α,σ) is in the SDS, it follows that α is maximal (but not necessarily
feasible).6,7
2.3.2 Other bargaining sets and the core
Something similar can be said about the traditional bargaining sets, deﬁned on
the space of individually rational payoﬀ conﬁgurations. We do not actually require
(ασ,σ) to be an individually rational payoﬀ conﬁguration, but this property arises
endogenously.
Remark 2 If (α,σ) is in the SDS, then (ασ,σ) is an individually rational payoﬀ
conﬁguration.8
Since the stable outcomes in the sense of the SDS lie in the space of individually
rational payoﬀ conﬁgurations, it is interesting to relate the SDS to other solution
concepts that lie in this standard domain, like the bargaining sets and the core.
Remark 3 Since the core is the set of allocations to which there are no objections,
the SDS contains the core.
Maximality implies that if (α,σ) is in the SDS and the realized allocation and
coalition structure are such that all players receive their demands, then α is in the
core. Thus, the SDS coincides w i t ht h ec o r ef o rt h eg r a n dc o a l i t i o n . I ft h ec o r e
of v is empty, there is no allocation in the SDS such that all players receive their
demands.9
6Consider the following game: N = {1,2,3}, v(1,2) = 6, v(1,3) = v(2,3) = 2, v(N)=3 . The
demand vector (3,3,x)i si nt h eS D Sf o ra n yx ≥ 0, though only x = 0 is feasible.
7Even though a stable demand vector α may not be feasible for some players it cannot be
unfeasible for all players except in the uninteresting case with v(T) ≤
P
i∈T v(i) for all T ⊆ N.
8The maximality of the demand vector together with the allocation rule guarantee individual
rationality.
9Like the core, it is easy to show that the SDS may be empty. To see this, consider a four-player
game where v(S)=1i f|S| =3 ,v (S)=0o t h e r w i s e .W h a t e v e r( α,σ) one starts from, it is possible
to ﬁnd an acceptable objection where two players are given more than α, making it impossible to
counterobject using α itself.
6There are two bargaining sets that deﬁne objections and counterobjections as
made not by individual players but by coalitions: the Mas-Colell (1989) bargaining
set and the Zhou (1994) bargaining set. When compared to the Mas-Colell bar-
gaining set, the SDS makes both objections and counterobjections more diﬃcult, so
that none of the sets is contained in the other.
We now turn to the Zhou bargaining set. The SDS and the Zhou bargaining
s e ts h a r et h es a m ed e ﬁnition of objection. As for the deﬁnition of counterobjection,
they cannot be directly ranked. The SDS makes justiﬁed objections easier since
it requires counterobjections to use the original demand vector and some of the
counterobjecting players to be strictly better oﬀ, whereas the Zhou bargaining set
requires only that the counterobjecting players are weakly better oﬀ. On the other
hand, counterobjecting could seem easier in our framework, since the SDS does not
impose the requirements Z\T 6= ∅ and T\Z 6= ∅.H o w e v e rw ea r ea b l et os h o w( b y
contradiction) that the balance of these conﬂicting forces implies that the SDS is
included in the Zhou bargaining set.
Theorem 1 If (α,σ) is in the SDS, then (ασ,σ) is in the Zhou bargaining set.
Proof. Suppose (α,σ) is in the SDS but (ασ,σ) is not in the Zhou bargaining
set. Then, there must be a coalition T that has an objection y such that any
counterobjecting coalition Z satisﬁes either Z ⊂ T or T ⊂ Z.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which T has an objection and Z ⊂ T has a counterob-
jection. Then it must be the case that αi >y i > ασ
i for all i ∈ Z,t h u sZ itself has
aj u s t i ﬁed objection and (α,σ) cannot be in the SDS.
Consider now the case in which T has an objection that can only be countered
by supersets of T.L e t Z be one of those supersets. Since Z is a superset of T,
it follows that αi >y i for all i in T. Maximality, together with the fact that the
demand vector α is feasible for Z, implies
P
i∈Z αi = v(Z). Z itself has an objection
in which one of the players in T (say, j) receives less than his demand and each other
player in Z receives more than his demand. In order for (α,σ) to be in the SDS,
there must be a counterobjection to this objection. Let Z0 be one of the coalitions
7that have a counterobjection to this objection. Z0 must contain player j and cannot
contain any other player in T.B u t t h e n Z0 itself has a counterobjection to the
original objection by coalition T, contradicting the assumption that this objection
can only be countered by supersets of T.10 QED.
Corollary 1 The requirements T\Z 6= ∅ and/or Z\T 6= ∅ could have been imposed
in deﬁnition 2 without changing the SDS.
2.3.3 Elimination of dominated coalition structures
An important property of the SDS is that it eliminates the “dominated” coalition
structures for grand-coalition superadditive games,11 and therefore constitutes a
meaningful selection of the Zhou bargaining set. In order to show why such selection
is meaningful, let us explain what a dominated coalition structure is, and then give
an example.




i <v (T), for some T ⊂ S for some S ∈ σ (2)
or




i and T is union of elements of σ. (3)
Example 1 Consider the players’ set N = {1,2,3,4} with
v(T)=4 if |T| =2
v(S)=|S| otherwise.
In this example (example 2.6 in Zhou (1994)) both the grand coalition and the
all-singletons coalition structure are dominated. However, the grand coalition with
equal payoﬀ division is included in the Zhou bargaining set and in the Mas-Colell
10Z
0 can only be a superset of T if T is a singleton. Notice that since the SDS only contains
individually rational payoﬀ conﬁgurations, any objecting set T must have at least two players.
11A game is grand-coalition superadditive iﬀ for any σ ∈ Σ,v (N) ≥
P
S∈σ v(S).
8bargaining set. The same happens with the “all-singletons” coalition structure.12
Neither of these unintuitive coalition structures is stable in the sense of the SDS.
The general ability of the SDS to eliminate unreasonable coalition structures from
being stable13 is established in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 If (N,v) is grand-coalition superadditive and (α,σ) is in the SDS, then
σ cannot be dominated given α.
Proof. If (α,σ) in the SDS, maximality ensures that there is no T satisfying
condition (2). As for condition (3), suppose ∃T : v(T) >
P
i∈T ασ
i and T is the
union of elements of σ. If (α,σ) is such that all players in T are receiving their
demands, T itself has a justiﬁed objection. If (α,σ) is such that not all players
in T are receiving their demands, call Z the set of players who are receiving their










i∈N\Z v(i). Consider an objection by the grand coalition
that gives all players in Z more than their demands. A counterobjecting coalition
C cannot include any players from Z. Thus, if a counterobjecting coalition exists,
this counterobjecting coalition itself has a justiﬁed objection. QED.
Corollary 2 If v(N) >
P
S∈σ v(S) for all σ ∈ Σ, only the grand coalition can be
stable in the sense of the SDS.
Unlike the Zhou bargaining set, the SDS has the dummy player property. The
SDS is also immune to two more criticisms often made to other solution concepts
in the family of bargaining sets: the fact that they are “too large” and the fact that
they are sometimes diﬃcult to compute.14
12The traditional bargaining set (Davis and Maschler, 1967) is always nonempty for all coalition
structures (see Peleg, 1967).
13Notice that the elimination of dominated coalition structures may be at the cost of emptiness
of the solution concept, since there are games that have only dominated coalition structures.
14See Maschler (1992) for a lucid discussion of these two problems.
9As far as the ﬁrst problem is concerned, Theorems 1 and 2 hint that the SDS
is less exposed to that problem than most other solution concepts of the same
family. In particular, we will show below that the SDS predicts a unique payoﬀ
distribution for all constant-sum weighted majority games admitting a homogeneous
representation, while other bargaining sets typically admit a continuum of payoﬀ
distributions.
As far as the second problem is concerned, the results of this paper indicate that
it is possible, at least for some classes of games, to construct algorithms to generate
the allocation(s) in the SDS.
2.3.4 Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets
Both the SDS and stable sets require counterobjections to be related to the original
allocation, but not in the same way: in a stable set, a counterobjection may be very
diﬀerent from the original proposal but it has to belong to the same stable set; in
the SDS a counterobjection does not have to belong to the SDS but it has to use the
original demand vector. Unlike the stable sets (and like all other bargaining sets),
the SDS is not deﬁn e di na” c i r c u l a r ”w a y :t h ed e ﬁnition of stability in the sense of
the SDS applies to each element separately and not to the whole set. Thus, whether
ap a r t i c u l a r( α,σ) is stable does not depend on whether other pairs are stable.
I ng e n e r a l ,t h eS D Sm a yn o tb eas t a b l es e t .S i n c et h eS D Sm a yc o i n c i d ew i t ht h e
core, it is clear that the SDS may not be externally stable15. For a counterexample
on internal stability, consider the following game.
Example 2 N = {1,2,3,4}, v(1,2,3) = 3, v(2,4) = v(3,4) = 2. All other values
are zero.
The SDS contains a continuum of stable demand vectors. We concentrate on
two of them: (1,1,1,1) and (0,1.5,1.5,0.5). The ﬁrst one is stable with coali-
tion structure {{1,2,3},{4}}, and the second one is stable with coalition structures
15Take N = {1,2,3}, v(1,2) = v(1,3) = v(1,2,3) = 1. The only vector in the SDS is (1,0,0),






4)a r en o td o m i n a t e d .
10{{1},{2},{3,4}}, {{1},{3},{2,4}} and {{1,2,3},{4}}. The allocation resulting
from the ﬁrst pair, (1,1,1,0) is dominated by the allocation resulting from the sec-
ond pair, (0,0,1.5,0.5)), thus the SDS is not internally stable. The example also
shows that a stable demand vector need not be unique and that the same vector
(in this case (1,1,1,1)) may be stable with some coalition structures and not with
others (coalition structure {{1},{2},{3,4}} is also feasible with this demand vector
b u ti ti sn o ts t a b l eb e c a u s ec o a l i t i o n{1,2,3} can object with (1 − 2²,1+²,1+²)
and no counterobjection is possible).
However, we will see in the next section that for the special case of constant-sum
homogeneous weighted majority games the SDS makes the same predictions as one
of the stable sets, called the main simple solution.
We now turn to the characterization and predictions that the SDS allows us to
obtain for the important class of weighted majority games.
3 Characterization for Weighted Majority Games
3.1 Deﬁnitions, Assumptions, and Auxiliary Results
A coalitional game (N,v)i sasimple game iﬀ v(∅)=0 ,v (N)=1 ,v (S)=0o r1
and v(S) = 1 whenever v(T)=1f o rs o m eT ⊂ S.
Denote by Ω ≡ {S : v(S)=1 } the set of winning coalitions (WC) and by
Ωm ≡ {S : v(S)=1 ,v (T)=0f o ra l lT ⊂ S} the set of minimal winning coalitions
(MWC).
A simple game is called proper iﬀ for all S ∈ Ω,N \S/ ∈ Ω.I ti sc a l l e dstrong iﬀ
for all S/ ∈ Ω,N \S ∈ Ω. Proper and strong simple games are called constant-sum.
As i m p l eg a m e( N,v)i saweighted majority game iﬀ there exists a vector of
non-negative weights w and a number q (0 <q≤
Pn
i=1 wi)s u c ht h a t




Assumption 1 (N,v) is a constant-sum weighted majority game.16
16As u ﬃcient condition for a game with integer weights to be constant-sum is p ≡
Pn
i=1 wi to be
11Assumption 2 wi <q for all i ∈ N.17
Assumptions 1 and 2 together imply n ≥ 3 and exclude the presence of veto
players in the game.
A weighted majority game admits a homogeneous representation iﬀ there exists
av e c t o rw (and an induced quota q)s u c ht h a t
X
i∈S
wi = q for all S ∈ Ωm. (4)
A weighted majority game admitting a homogeneous representation is called a
homogeneous weighted majority game.
Example 3 Consider a four-player game where player 1 holds 3 votes, player 2
holds 2, and players 3, 4 hold 1; this representation is not homogeneous: there is
one MWC with 5 votes, and three MWCs with 4 votes; however, an equivalent
r e p r e s e n t a t i o no ft h es a m ec h a r a c t e r i s t i cf u n c t i o ng a m ei so n ew h e r ep l a y e r1h a s2
votes, players 2, 3, 4 have one vote each, and this is homogeneous.
Denote by Wi the set of winning coalitions containing player i for a given game
(N,v). Notice that Wi ⊆ Ω,a n dWi = Ω only if i is a veto player. Denote by µi
the number of WCs in Wi. Similarly, denote by Mi the set of MWCs containing
player i and mi is the number of MWCs in Mi.
Lemma 1 Consider a weighted majority game satisfying assumption 1; for every
player i,e i t h e rmi =0or mi ≥ 2.
Proof.S u p p o s e t h a t f o r s o m e i there exists a MWC S ∈ Mi.S i n c e t h e g a m e
is strong, the coalition T ≡ {N \ S} ∪ {i} must be a winning coalition. Either T
itself is a MWC, or there must exist Z ⊂ T such that Z ∈ Ωm, and such a coalition
Z must contain i,o t h e r w i s eS would not have been winning in the ﬁrst place. In
either case, mi ≥ 2. QED.
an odd number and q =
p+1
2 .I fq is a smaller number the game may not be proper, whereas for a
larger q, as well as for an even number of votes, the game may not be strong.
17Otherwise the coalitional game would be irrelevant.
12Corollary 3 For any MWC S containing player i,w ec a nﬁnd another MWC S0
such that S ∩ S0 = {i}.
Deﬁnition 7 Player i and player j a r eo ft h es a m et y p ei ﬀ the characteristic func-
tion is unchanged when permuting them.
Remark 4 If (N,v) is a weighted majority game and µi = µj,t h e ni and j are of
t h es a m et y p e .
Proof. Suppose not. Then, without loss of generality, wi >w j.C o n s i d e r t h e
winning coalitions that contain either i or j, {Wi∪Wj}\{Wi∩Wj}.I fw et a k et h e
coalitions in Wj\Wi and replace j by i, the resulting coalition are all winning. If
we take a coalition in Wi\Wj and replace i by j the resulting coalitions cannot be
all winning, or i and j would be the same type. But then µi >µ j, a contradiction.
In general, if two players, i,j,h a v ed i ﬀerent numbers of votes (wi 6= wj), it
does not follow that they must be of a diﬀerent type, i.e., they not necessarily have
diﬀerent bargaining power. For example, consider a three-player game, where one
has 5 votes, one has 4, and one 3. 7 votes are needed to win, and hence every
pair of players can make it. Every player has the same number of MWCs (and
of WCs), and permuting them does not change the characteristic function, even
though every player has a diﬀerent weight. There is no reason why the player with
5 votes should have more bargaining power than the other two. In fact, an equivalent
homogeneous representation of this game is one where each of the three players has
1 vote. For homogeneous representations of weighted majority games players with
diﬀerent numbers of votes are indeed of diﬀerent types. While it is always true that
if wi = wj then µi = µj, the converse is true (as established below) if the game is
strong and homogeneous.
Remark 5 If the coalitional game (N,v) satisﬁes assumption 1 and admits a ho-
mogeneous representation through some vector w,t h e nµi = µj −→ wi = wj, ∀
i : Mi 6= ∅, ∀ j : Mj 6= ∅.
13Proof. Suppose that µi = µj and wi >w j. Consider all the WCs that contain
either i or j: {Wi ∪ Wj}\{ Wi ∩ Wj}. These sets are always non-empty because
of Corollary 3. If we take every single coalition in Wj \{ Wi ∩ Wj} and substitute
j with i,w ea l w a y so b t a i naW Cw i t hi, while when substituting i with j in every
coalition in Wi \{Wi ∩Wj} this is not the case: wi >w j plus homogeneity implies
that there exists at least one MWC containing i but not j with exactly q votes, and
this in turn implies that after the substitution the coalition would not be winning
anymore. Hence µi >µ j. Contradiction. QED.
Lemma 2 Let (N,v) be a homogeneous weighted majority game satisfying Assump-
tions 1 and 2. Let i and j be two players such that each of them belongs to at least
one MWC. Then there is a MWC containing both i and j.
Proof.L e t S be a MWC containing i. If it also contains j, we are done. If it
does not, consider N\S ∪{i}. Because the game is strong, this coalition is winning.
It includes a MWC T 3 i.I fT 3 j,w ea r ed o n e .I fn o t ,t h i si m p l i e swj <w i.N o w
we take a coalition S0 3 j and repeat the same process. This time we cannot throw
away i, because it would imply that wi <w j, a contradiction. QED.
3.2 The Proportionality Result
Theorem 2 has the following implication for the selection of coalition structures in
weighted majority games:
Lemma 3 T h eo n l y“ c a n d i d a t ep a i r s ”(α,σ) for the SDS of any weighted majority
game satisfying Assumption 1 are those where
(1) For any T ∈ Ω,
P
i∈T αi ≥ v(T);
(2) σ always includes a WC S ∈ Ω with
P
i∈S αi = v(S).
Proof. (1) follows from maximality. The fact that σ must include a winning
coalition follows from Theorem 2. Since σ must be compatible with α,
P
i∈S αi
cannot exceed v(S), which together with maximality implies
P
i∈S αi = v(S). QED.
14Theorem 3 Consider a weighted majority game (N,v) satisfying Assumption 1 and
2 that admits a homogeneous representation with weights w1,...,wn.I ft h e r ea r en o
dummy players, the SDS of any such game is non-empty and only contains pairs





, for all i
and σ always contains a MWC S.
If there are dummy players, the SDS is non-empty and only contains pairs (α∗,σ)
where α∗
i = wi
q for all non-dummy players and σ contains a winning coalition.
Proof. We ﬁrst provide the proof for the case in which there are no dummy
players.
Consider a pair where there is a MWC S ∈ σ and the demand vector is α∗.W e
ﬁrst show that (α∗,σ) is in the SDS of the game.
Since (N,v) is proper, any blocking coalition T must contain some agents in
common with S (i.e., T ∩ S 6= ∅). T c a nm a k ea no b j e c t i o nt o( α∗,σ) only if there
exists a payoﬀ vector y feasible for T such that yi > wi
q for all i ∈ T ∩ S.D e ﬁne
Z ≡ {i ∈ T : yi ≥ wi
q }.B e c a u s eZ ⊇ {T ∩ S} and all agents in T ∩ S must receive
strictly more than wi
q , it follows that Z is a losing coalition (Z winning would be
unfeasible). Thus, there must be a WC C ⊆ N\Z,a n daM W CC0 ⊆ C. Since
the game is homogeneous, α∗ is feasible for any MWC, thus coalition C0 has a
counterobjection: since the game is proper, C0 ∩ T 6= ∅. Moreover, the fact that C0
is included in N\Z ensures that all players in C0 ∩ T are strictly better-oﬀ.
We have shown that no objection to (α∗,σ)c a nb ej u s t i ﬁed, because every
objection would lead to a counterobjection using α∗ once again. In order to complete
the proof, we now have to show that any pair (α,σ)w i t hα 6= α∗ is vulnerable to
justiﬁed objections.
Suppose (α,σ) is in the SDS but α 6= α∗.W ed e ﬁne the sets
U ≡ {i ∈ N : αi < α∗
i}, the set of “underdemanding” players.
F ≡ {i ∈ N : αi = α∗
i}, the set of players demanding exactly α∗.
O ≡ {i ∈ N : αi > α∗
i}, the set of “overdemanding” players.
15There are two possibilities:
Case 1) U = ∅. Since U = ∅ and α 6= α∗,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tαi ≥ α∗
i
for all i and αj > α∗
j for some j. We know from Lemma 3 that σ contains a
winning coalition S such that
P
i∈S αi = v(S). Since U = ∅, coalitions containing
overdemanding players are unfeasible, thus S must be such that αi = α∗
i for all
i ∈ S, therefore j/ ∈ S. Any MWC T 3 j has a justiﬁed objection. In this objection,
any player i ∈ T ∩F receives α∗
i +² and any player i in T ∩O receives some positive
payoﬀ.N o t i c et h a tj ∈ T and T being a MWC ensures that players in T∩F have less
than q votes, so that this payoﬀ distribution is feasible. Since S∩O = ∅,a n yp o s i t i v e
payoﬀ m a k e st h ep l a y e r si nT ∩ O better-oﬀ, hence we indeed have an objection.
There is no possible counterobjection, since it would have to include some players
in T ∩ O, and any coalition containing overdemanding players is unfeasible.
Case 2): U 6= ∅. This implies O 6= ∅ (otherwise we would contradict maximality).
A g a i n ,w ek n o wf r o mL e m m a3t h a tσ contains a winning coalition S such that
P
i∈S αi = v(S). We will distinguish two cases:
Case 2a) S ⊆ F.T a k ea n yp l a y e rj ∈ U,a n da n yM W CT 3 j.D e n o t eT ∪ U
by Z. Coalition Z has a justiﬁed objection in which every member of Z\O gets
α∗
i + ² and every member of Z ∩ O gets a positive payoﬀ. To see this, notice that
this payoﬀ division is feasible for Z if ² is small enough.18 S ⊆ F implies that all
players in Z are made better-oﬀ by the objection. Finally, since a counterobjection
must include at least one player from Z ∩ O, and it can include no players from U,
it follows that no counterobjecting coalition is feasible given α.
Case 2b) S is not a subset of F. Lemma 3 implies S ∩ O 6= ∅ and S ∩ U 6= ∅.
Notice that S need not be a MWC. There is a MWC S0 ⊆ S such that S0 ∩ O 6= ∅
and S0 ∩ U 6= ∅,a n dS ∩ O ⊆ S0.L e t Z := (N\S0) ∪ U. As in case 2a, Z has a
justiﬁed objection in which every member of Z\O gets α∗
i + ² and every member of
Z ∩ O gets a positive payoﬀ. Note that the diﬀerence with case 2a is that, in the
18This follows because Z\O is a losing coalition. If it were winning, one could ﬁnd a subset of
Z\O having exactly q votes, and containing at least one player from U (because of the way Z has
been constructed, Z\U is losing), contradicting maximality.
16construction of Z we had to make sure that Z ∩ (S ∩ O)=∅.
Given that α∗ is the only stable payoﬀ vector and that dominated coalition
structures are excluded from the SDS, it follows that σ must contain a minimal
winning coalition.
If there are dummy players, their actual payoﬀ is always zero but their demands
are not constrained. A dummy player can be part of a winning coalition in σ if his
demand is zero. QED.
Remark 6 Notice that the SDS depends only on the characteristic function, and
hence it is invariant to the particular representation chosen.
Remark 7 Note that what matters is the homogeneous representation. For ex-
ample, in every 3-player weighted majority game where Assumptions 1 a n d2a r e
satisﬁed, the equivalent homogeneous representations give equal weights to the three
players, and hence the unique Stable Demand vector is α∗ =( 1 /2,1/2,1/2).
Remark 8 If (α,σ) is in the SDS of a homogeneous game (N,v) satisfying As-






i∈S αi ≥ 1 for all S ∈ Ωm.
(5)
This implies that α is a balanced aspiration.
Proof. Suppose α is a solution to the minimization problem but α 6= α∗.T h i s
implies U 6= ∅.T a k ei1 ∈ U and a MWC S containing i1. Because of maximality,
the sum of the demands in this MWC is at least 1. In order for α to have a smaller
sum than α∗, there must be at least another player from U in N\S. Consider the
set N\S ∪ {i1}. Because the game is strong, this is a WC. If it is also a MWC,
it contradicts maximality. Otherwise, there is a MWC included in it. In order for
maximality to be satisﬁed, there must have been some player from U that has been
thrown away. Call this player i2.N o wt a k eaM W CS2 including player i2.B e c a u s e
we could take i2 away and still have a WC, w2 <w 1.N o w w e r e p e a t t h e s a m e
17reasoning with i2 and conclude that α cannot be in the aspiration core without
the existence of a player i3 in U with w3 <w 2 a n ds oo n . S i n c ew eo n l yh a v ea
ﬁnite set of players, this cannot continue for ever, and on the way we have to ﬁnd a
contradiction. QED.
Recall the following result shown by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). If
for a constant-sum simple game (N,v)t h e r ei sav e c t o rx =( x1,...,xn)w i t he a c h
xi ≥ 0s u c ht h a tx(S) = 1 whenever S is a minimal winning coalition, the set of
imputation vectors {zS : zS
i = xi ∀i ∈ S and zi =0∀i ∈ N\S, S ∈ Ωm} is a stable
set and was called the Main Simple Solution by von Neumann and Morgenstern.
The weighted majority games that we have studied in this section are a subset of
this set of games, hence the next remark:
Remark 9 The set of imputations {α∗σ} derived from the set of pairs {(α∗,σ) ∈
SDS} coincides with the Main Simple Solution.
This means that among the many VNM stable sets of constant-sum weighted
majority games, the SDS selects the one that was singled out by von Neumann and
Morgenstern as the most meaningful one19.
3.3 The Apex Game
C o n s i d e r ,a sa ne x a m p l e ,t h es oc a l l e dA p e xG a m e . 20
There are n =5p l a y e r s ,w h e r e{1,2,3,4} have one vote each and player 5 has
three votes. Thus, q =4 .T h eM W C sa r e :
I: {5,i};
II: {1,2,3,4}.
The SDS makes, we believe, the most reasonable prediction, i.e., that if I forms
then player 5 receives 3/4, and the other player gets 1/4 (proportional payoﬀs); if
19Furthermore, the SDS coincides with the main simple solution for all constant-sum simple
games admitting a main simple solution, even if they are not weighted majority games.
20Davis & Maschler (1965) used this example to contrast the predictions of the existing solution
concepts. The name “apex game” came later.
18II forms they share equally (1/4e a c h ) .
T h ep r o o ft h a tt h eo n l ys t a b l ed e m a n dv e c t o r( f o rt h i se x a m p l e )i st h ep r o p o r -
tional one can be summarized as follows.
Consider ﬁrst the proposal where the demand vector is α∗ =( 1 /4,1/4,1/4,1/4,3/4)
and the coalition structure includes the WC I.
O n ep o s s i b l eo b j e c t i o nt ot h i sp r o p o s a li sc o a l i t i o nI but with a diﬀerent small
player, and where y is (3/4+²,1/4−²). However, these objections are not justiﬁed,
because there exists a counterobjection to each of them, with the vector α∗ and the
WC II. The second (and last) kind of objection to the pair (α∗,I), would be one
with the four small players together, where the “blocker” receives 1/4+² and the
others share the rest. But then at least one of these other three small players must
be receiving less than 1/4, and can therefore counter by oﬀering again α∗ to player
5.
Consider then the pair (α∗,II). The objection to be considered here is one with
I and payoﬀs( 3 /4 − ²,1/4+²); to this, however, there exists a counterobjection
with (3/4,1/4) and I (with a simple replacement of the small agent in the WC),
and hence there is no justiﬁed objection. It is ﬁnally easy to see that no other pair
can be in the SDS.
T h ec o r eo ft h eA p e xG a m ei se m p t y ,a si tw o u l db ef o ra n yo t h e rc o n s t a n t - s u m
essential game. The Shapley Value only looks at the ex ante balance of power, which
here implies 3/5 for the big player and 1/10 for each small player. Similarly, the nu-
cleolus with respect to the grandcoalition has the allocation (3/7,1/7,1/7,1/7,1/7)
(the homogeneous representation of the game itself)21 and can again be interpreted
as an ex ante evaluation. While this solution assigns each player the appropriate
relative bargaining power, this property disappears when the nucleolus is computed
with respect to coalition structures containing a MWC: for example, if MWC I
forms, the nucleolus gives each of the two players a payoﬀ of 1/2, in spite of the
very diﬀerent endowments. Since we have established that the coalition structures
including a MWC are the only meaningful ones, the nucleolus and the Shapley Value
21See Peleg (1968).
19are therefore not appropriate solutions for these games if one wants an ex post pre-
diction, i.e., a prediction of the payoﬀ distribution contingent on one of the possible
coalition structures prevailing, i.e., contingent on which MWC prevails.
The competitive bargaining set (Horowitz, 1973) predicts proportional payoﬀs
contingent on I or IIbeing formed, but it allows for dominated coalition structures.22
The traditional bargaining set, on the other hand, not only allows for dominated
coalition structures (like the grand-coalition), but it also gives an uninformative
prediction about the payoﬀ distribution even when contingent on an undominated
coalition structure. In fact, it contains I as one of the possible coalitions in a solution,
but with a payoﬀ vector x =( x5,1 − x5), where x5 c a nt a k ea n yv a l u eb e t w e e n3
4
and 1
2. The same occurs with the Zhou bargaining set and with the Mas-Colell
bargaining set (the latter excludes the extreme payoﬀs 3
4 and 1
2). The equal division
(x =( 1
2, 1
2)) corresponds to the kernel and its supersets the reactive bargaining set
(Granot and Maschler, 1997) and the semireactive bargaining set (Sudh¨ olter and
Potters, 1999). The main simple solution yields the same prediction as the SDS for
the apex game, but there are other stable sets. The aspiration solution concepts
coincide with the SDS for apex games, but only the aspiration core coincides with
the SDS for constant-sum homogeneous weighted majority games in general (the
remaining aspiration solution concepts may be larger).
4 Implementation of the SDS
In this section, we provide an implementation of the SDS via a simple mechanism in
which an auxiliary set of individuals compete over the n players in the cooperative
game, following P´ erez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2000). We will assume that the
cooperative game (N,v) is zero-normalized, superadditive and has the following
property: v(S) >
P
i∈S v(i) implies v(N\S)=
P
i∈N\S v(i). This property is called
the one-stage property (Selten, 1981) and implies that no more than one proﬁtable
coalition can be formed at a time.
22Moreover, the competitive bargaining set may be empty for other constant-sum homogeneous
weighted majority games.
20The mechanism is played by four auxiliary individuals called principals. The
principals have lexicographic preferences: in the ﬁrst place they want to maximize
proﬁt sb u t ,o t h e rt h i n g se q u a l ,t h e yp r e f e rt oh i r ea sm a n ya g e n t sa sp o s s i b l e . 23
The mechanism M is played as follows:
Stage 1. Principal 1 chooses (α,S), with α ∈ Rn and S ⊆ N. The bid of
principal 1 for agent i, xi,i sc o m p u t e di nt h ef o l l o w i n gw a y :xi = αi for i ∈ S and
0o t h e r w i s e .
Stage 2. P2 and P3 simultaneously choose y2 and y3 ∈ Rn.W e w i l l d e n o t e
max(y2
i ,y3
i)b yyi. Given the bid vectors x, y2 and y3, each agent is provisionally
assigned to the principal that oﬀers the highest price (or wage). Ties are broken in
favor of the principal with the lowest index. Let Tj be the set of players provisionally
assigned to principal j =1 ,2,3. If one principal gets all the agents, the game ends
and the principal that got the agents receives v(N)l e s st h ew a g e so ft h en agents.
I fn op r i n c i p a lh a sg o ta l lt h ea g e n t s ,t h eg a m em o v e st ot h en e x ts t a g e .
Stage 3. P4 may hire any set Z of agents under the following conditions:
1) He has to oﬀer them zi = αi;
2) Z must contain elements of both T1 and T2 ∪ T3;
3) z must make all the players in Z weakly better-oﬀ, and players in Z∩(T2∪T3)
strictly better-oﬀ.
Finally, principal j (j =1 ,2,3) hires the agents in Tj\Z and pays them the wage
oﬀered; P4 hires the agents in Z and pays them z.
Theorem 4 The mechanism M implements the SDS in SPE.
Proof. We ﬁrst construct an equilibrium of the mechanism M for any (α,σ)i n
the SDS chosen by P1.
Consider the following strategies: P1 submits (α,S), where S is the set of players
receiving their demands given (α,σ), that is, S = {i ∈ N : ασ
i = αi}.A f t e ro b s e r v i n g
23This type of preferences is also assumed by P´ erez-Castrillo and Wettstein in one of their
mechanisms.
21this choice, P2 and P3 bid y2 = y3 = x = ασ (and play an equilibrium in all other
subgames). If the game reaches stage 3, P4 plays a best response.
Given these strategies, P1 gets all the agents and all principals make zero proﬁts.
To show that this is an equilibrium, we prove that there is no proﬁtable deviation
at stage 1 or 2 (since at stage 3 this is the case by construction).
Let us ﬁrst rule out that P1 has a proﬁtable deviation. This cannot be the case
because P2 would not be playing a best response.24
Any proﬁtable deviation by P2 or P3 corresponds to an objection to (α,σ). The
third stage would be reached after the deviation (an objection that takes all the
players is excluded by theorem 2). Since (α,σ) is in the SDS, there is a counterob-
j e c t i o nt ot h i so b j e c t i o n .P 4h i r i n gs o m ea g e n t sc o r r e s p o n d st oac o u n t e r o b j e c t i o n
and, since P4 prefers to hire more agents rather than less, he will always counter-
object. The one-stage property ensures that the deviator (P2 or P3) would be left
with a negative proﬁt.
Now we prove that the outcome of any SPE of the mechanism M is in the SDS
(provided nonempty).
First, all principals make nonnegative proﬁts in equilibrium. Second, they all
make zero proﬁts (if some principal is making positive proﬁts, P2 or P3 could bid ²
more for all agents the other principals would be getting, get all the agents and end
the game). Third, P1 must have all the agents. Because of the one-stage property,
P1 can secure all the agents by choosing (α,S) such that the corresponding (α,σ)
is in the SDS, so any strategy combination in which P1 does not get all the agents
cannot be an equilibrium. Fourth, (α,σ) is in the SDS. Suppose not. Then P2 is
not playing a best response, since he can make an objection, secure some agents,
a n dP 4c a n n o td oa n y t h i n gs i n c et h e r ei sn oc o u n t e r o b j e c t i o n . 25 QED.
24Since P2, P3 and P4 play best responses in all subgames, after the deviation by P1 all principals
make nonnegative proﬁts. Moreover, P3 and P4 pay for the agents at least what P1 oﬀered them.
I tf o l l o w st h a tP 2c a n n o tb ep l a y i n gab e s tr e s p o n s e :s l i g h t l yo v e r b i d d i n gP 1( a n dp o s s i b l yP 3 )a n d
thus getting all the agents and ﬁnishing the game would be proﬁtable.
25In the mechanisms of P´ erez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2000) the designer does not need to know
the characteristic function; in our mechanism, the game is zero-normalized, so the designer knows
225 Concluding Remarks
Payoﬀ distribution and coalition formation should be studied simultaneously. Since
value concepts give only an ex ante evaluation of the prospectives of diﬀerent players,
they cannot be used to predict the ex post payoﬀ distribution in an “equilibrium”
coalition structure. Solution concepts that keep the spirit of core-like competition,
respecting individual rationality as well as group rationality, seem more appropriate
for this task. The stable demand set is, we believe, a meaningful addition to the set
of concepts of this family. In fact, it is a selection of the Zhou bargaining set that
manages to eliminate from the set of solutions all the counterintuitive solutions that
are dominated, and gives a precise prediction for the important class of constant-
sum homogeneous weighted majority games. The selection of undominated coalition
structures makes the SDS, in our view, a very useful concept, with a much sharper
predictive power than previous concepts in the family of bargaining sets. It is
not always nonempty, but the proportional prediction for homogeneous weighted
majority games suggests that it can be used in important allocation and distribution
problems where the core is empty.
However, predictive power was not the only motivation of the paper. The main
conceptual contribution of the stable demand set is the idea itself of self-stability of
demands. A set of “claims” by the players is considered stable if the same claims
can be used by some subset of the players to counter any possible objection to
the assignment of those claims. Intuitively, this is an important requirement in
distributive politics or in any distributive problem in legislatures: the advocates
of any given distributive “norm” (like “to everyone according to its contribution”)
should be able, if they want that norm to prevail, to counter any objection by
making reference to the norm itself. Countering an objection with a completely
v(i) for all i in N. The extension to a completely unknown characteristic functions is straightfor-
ward: let P1 complete the vector x himself and add a ﬁnal stage in which the agents accept or reject
t h ew a g eo ﬀer (this would have been a problem for the original mechanisms of P´ erez-Castrillo and
Wettstein since they implement bargaining sets that are not individually rational). In equilibrium
P1 will complete the vector x with v(i) for all i/ ∈ S.
23unrelated counterobjection would not be convincing as much as an argument that
uses the same norm originally proposed. Asking that counterobjections have to
use exactly the initial demand vector is an extreme form of consistency with the
initial proposed norm, and in future research it could be interesting to study weaker
forms of consistency, but we believe that this concept will serve at least as an useful
benchmark for this type of investigation of the way social norms are agreed upon.
Morelli (1999) studies demand bargaining games that produce similar predictions
to the SDS for homogeneous weighted majority games. However, the connection
between those noncooperative games and the SDS is not one-to-one. Selten (1981)
implements the set of partnered aspirations, which is a superset of the SDS for
constant-sum homogeneous weighted majority games. Here, instead, we managed
to obtain a tight implementation result.
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